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ABSTRACT 
 
Relative to the past policies of its Member States, will the European 
Union’s new comprehensive international investment policy constitute a 
step forward, a step backward, or a perpetuation of the status quo?  
Professor Reinisch’s contribution to this volume opens a wide window on 
the current state of the debate.  His cogent analysis suggests that, at 
present, all three possibilities remain live ones, although some basic 
contours of a likely trajectory are beginning to take shape.  I use his 
musings as a springboard to investigate two questions which follow 
naturally from his. That is, in view of Professor Reinisch’s response to the 
question “where are you going, Europe?” I ask, first, where should 
European investment policy go next, and second, who should decide?  
These normative questions are pressing and require thoughtful answers 
developed through inter-institutional dialogue.  If the new EU-wide 
investment policy is to succeed, their resolution must take precedence over 
the more mundane, technical matters that have consumed the bulk of 
scholarly attention so far. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 European international investment policy stands at a crossroads.  With 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,
1
 foreign direct investment (FDI) 
now falls within the ambit of the Common Commercial Policy of the 
European Union.
2
  In effect, this means that the negotiation and 
ratification of international investment treaties will in future be conducted 
by the various organs of the Union acting on an EU-wide level rather than 
by the individual Member States acting in their own capacity and on their 
own behalf.  The Lisbon Treaty thus promises to bring about a much 
needed harmonization of the Member States’ hitherto disparate approaches 
to protecting and promoting foreign direct investment flows across their 
sovereign borders. 
Yet the crossroads at which the EU now finds itself is no simple Y-
junction.  Looking backward, its 27 Member States have not all come by 
the same road.  Germany arrives off a veritable super-highway of 
investment treaty activism, with nearly 120 existing bilateral investment 
treaties in tow.
3
  Ireland, by contrast, seemingly drops out of the sky with 
none.
4
  The  remaining 25 EU member countries approach from all 
manner of winding roads, each transporting varying numbers of 
investment treaties falling somewhere between these two extremes.
5
  All 
told, the European Union must, in the coming years, replace 1407 existing 
                                                 
1
 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, signed 13 December 2007, entered into force 1 December 
2009, Official Journal of the European Union, C 306/01 of 17 December 2007. 
2
 See arts 206, 207(1), and 207(4), European Union, Consolidated version of The Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115/47 of 9 May 2008 [hereinafter 
“Consolidated TFEU”].  The full texts of these articles are set forth in Professor 
Reinisch’s contribution to the present volume (August Reinisch, The EU on the 
Investment Path – Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs and other Investment 
Agreements, XX SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. XX (2013) [hereinafter Reinisch – Quo Vadis 
Europe?]).  Consolidated versions of all of the currently applicable EU treaties 
referenced in this comment may also be found in “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Council of the European Union,” 
[hereinafter “Consolidated TEU,” “Consolidated TFEU,” and “EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights,” respectively]  Doc. No. 6655/7/08 REV 7 (Brussels, 12 November 
2012), available at:  register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st06/st06655-re07.en08.pdf. 
3
 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, The Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, Towards a comprehensive European international investment 
policy, Annex, 7 July 2010, COM(2010) 343 final 4 [hereinafter “Commission – 
Towards a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy”]; available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146307.pdf. 
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. 
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bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with consolidated EU-wide 
agreements.
6
 
Looking forward, too, the crossroads at which the EU stands is not a 
typical fork in the road.  At such a fork, one has the luxury of choosing 
among a small number of well-defined paths with the reasonable certainty 
that they will lead to known destinations.  The EU, however, seeks to chart 
a path to the promised land of sustainable development and economic 
prosperity for all.
7
  It is generally agreed that this promised land lies 
somewhere beyond the wilderness of foreign investment policy.
8
  But 
from the current vantage point, numerous paths leading off in different 
directions through the wilderness are discernible – some more trodden9 
and others less so.
10
  The EU must now choose among these paths or 
decide to blaze a new trail of its own.  In making this choice, it must do its 
best to anticipate and prepare for the various kinds of natural hazards it is 
likely to encounter along the way. 
                                                 
6
 Ahmad Ali Ghouri, Resolving Incompatibilities of Bilateral Investment Treaties of the 
EU Member States with the EC Treaty: Individual and Collective Options, 16(6) 
EUROPEAN L. J. 806, 817 (2010), table 6.  This includes 1031 BITs concluded by 
Member States with non-EU states (extra-EU BITs) and 376 BITs concluded by EU 
Member States inter se (intra-EU BITs) but does not count the several hundred other 
agreements that have been signed by Member States but have not yet entered into force.  
For a list of all extra-EU BITs, including those signed but not yet in force, see List of the 
bilateral investment agreements referred to in Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 
1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing transitional 
arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third 
countries, Official Journal of the European Union, 2013/C 131/02, at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:131:0002:0098:EN:PDF 
7
 See Consolidated TEU, supra note 2, art. 3(3) (setting forth the Union’s goals 
concerning sustainable development, full employment, environmental protection, 
scientific advancement, social inclusion, etc). 
8
 See Commission – Towards a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 5 at p. 
3 (“While the relationship between FDI and economic growth and welfare is a complex 
one, on balance, both inward and outward investment have a positive impact on growth 
and employment in and outside the EU, including in developing countries.”); Council of 
the EU, Conclusions on a comprehensive European international investment policy, 
3041
st
 Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, 25 October 2010 [hereinafter “Council – 
Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy”], at p. 1; available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/117328.pdf 
(“acknowledging the crucial role of foreign direct investment in fostering 
competitiveness, economic growth and productivity, strengthening trade relations 
between nations, contributing to sustainable development, job creation and enhanced 
consumer benefits”); and European Parliament resolution of 6 April 2011 on the future 
European international investment policy, (2010/2203 (INI)) [hereinafter “Parliament – 
Resolution on a Future EU Investment Policy], para J.7; available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2011-
0141&language=EN (“investment can have a positive impact on growth and jobs, not 
only in the EU but also in developing countries”). 
9
 Like the recent Canadian and US Model BIT paths. 
10
 E.g. the Gillard Government’s announced policy of omitting investor-state dispute 
settlement from future Australian investment treaties. 
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In his piece The EU on the Investment Path – Quo Vadis Europe?, 
Professor Reinisch has done a remarkable job of providing a relief map to 
help would-be explorers of EU investment law and policy get the lay of 
the land.  He explains in lucid terms what the Lisbon Treaty means and 
what it doesn’t mean for the EU’s investment policymaking competence 
moving forward.  Anyone who knows anything about the complexity of 
EU law will immediately recognize that this expositional accomplishment 
is no small potatoes.   
Professor Reinisch’s article, however, goes well beyond the art of 
eloquent exposition to make several other notable contributions, two of 
which I will highlight here.  The first is to shed light on how the inter-
institutional power struggles being waged by the principal EU organs, 
namely, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council 
of the European Union (Council), and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), are shaping the future of EU international investment law 
and policy.  By way of illustration, Professor Reinisch charts how these 
power struggles have brought about a situation in which the EU’s new 
purported “exclusive competence”11 over investment policymaking may 
actually amount to a mixed competence shared with the Member States.
12
  
He points out that, during the transitional period, Member States still 
retain important powers like the ability to conclude new BITs with 
countries with whom the EU is not actively pursuing negotiations.
13
  And 
even beyond the transitional period, the Member States (acting through the 
Council) will enjoy an effective veto over the Commission’s EU-wide 
investment treaty negotiating initiatives, thanks to a special unanimity 
requirement included in the Lisbon Treaty.
14
   
Professor Reinisch deserves credit for underlining these structural 
features of the new European regime.  In doing so, he reminds the 
scholarly and policy-making communities that the EU’s much-discussed 
new competence in this domain is not quite as exclusive and may not 
prove quite as unifying as some harmonization advocates might hope. 
                                                 
11
 Article 207 of the Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, includes foreign direct investment 
within the areas covered by the Common Commercial Policy, and article 3(1) assigns 
exclusive competence over the CCP to the Union. 
12
 Reinisch – Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2 at parts II & III, and noting at p. 8:  “[t]he 
Council’s compromise position appears to be its insistence on investment as an area of 
mixed competences between the Union and its members.” 
13
 Albeit subject to an increased level of oversight by the Commission.  For details, see 
Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
December 2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment 
agreements between Member States and third countries, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L 351/40 (12 December 2012) [hereinafter “EU Regulation establishing 
transitional arrangements”], ch. III (Authorisation to amend or conclude a bilateral 
investment agreement), at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Result.do?direct=yes&lang=en&where=EUROVOC:003462&whereihm=E
UROVOC:bilateral%20agreement.  
14
 Reinisch – Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2 at p. 1 (quoting the “special unanimity 
requirement” of article 207(4) of the Consolidated TFEU). 
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In a second key contribution, Professor Reinisch peeks under the 
bonnet of the EU’s developing investment treaty negotiating agenda to 
provide an idea of where the new EU policy appears to be heading in 
practice.
15
  He does this by interweaving details from the Commission’s 
various policy communications with revelations from the Council’s leaked 
Negotiating Directives to the Commission.
16
  This discussion reveals that 
the Commission intends, at least for now, to pursue investment agreements 
which essentially hew to the model of the numerous 1980s and 1990s era 
investment treaties concluded by several influential Member States.
17
  
Professor Reinisch notes that there seems to be no concrete plan in place 
as yet to address the many regulatory concerns which the European 
Parliament has raised about the suitability of these older model investment 
treaties within a 21
st
 century international governance environment.
18
  In 
the final section of his article, he does an admirable job of highlighting 
this and other items one might expect to emerge as “controversial issues” 
over the coming years as the EU’s future union-wide investment policy 
continues to take shape.
19
  He concludes – correctly, I suspect – that the 
final word on many of the most pressing open questions will likely come 
from the CJEU. 
Overall, there is little I could add to Professor Reinisch’s insightful 
analysis of his chosen topics.  Instead, in my remarks, I wish to explore 
two questions which his analysis invites but does not address.
20
  They are, 
to my mind, the elephants in the room.  First, where should European 
investment policy go next (as distinguished from where is it going at 
present)?  And second, who should decide?  These are plainly normative 
questions and difficult ones at that.  Rather than purporting to offer 
definitive answers – a task which would exceed the scope of my limited 
reflections by a wide margin – I will confine myself to suggesting what I 
                                                 
15
 Id. at part IV. 
16
 This document, which concerns imminent or ongoing EU negotiations with Canada, 
India and Singapore, was obtained and leaked by NGOs.  See Council Negotiating 
Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), 12 September 2011 [hereinafter Council – 
Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore)], available at: 
http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article20272&lang=en and at 
http://www.s2bnetwork.org/themes/eu-investment-policy/eu-documents/text-of-the-
mandates.html.  
17
 Reinisch – Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2 at part V. 
18
 Reinisch notes that the protection of sovereign regulatory space is an objective shared 
in principle by the Parliament, the Council, and the Commission.  Id., at pp. 30-31.  
However, he seems to take for granted that the EU’s practice of including a general 
statement concerning the right to regulate in introductory chapter to its trade agreements 
will prove sufficient to protect Member States’ regulatory space when faced with 
investor-state arbitration claims under investment treaties.  This proposition seems 
dubious in the light of certain investment treaty arbitration decisions to the contrary.  For 
a more extensive consideration of this topic, see Jan Kleinheisterkamp, European Policy 
Space in International Investment Law, 27(2) ICSID REV. 416-431 (2012). 
19
 Reinisch – Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2 at part VI. 
20
 In this sense, I aim more to extend than to critique Professor Reinisch’s argument. 
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consider to be some worthwhile cogitations in approaching each of the 
two questions raised. 
The remainder of this comment proceeds as follows.  Part I explores 
the “ought” question:  where should European investment policy go next?  
I triangulate this query from the perspectives of empirics, policy, and 
practical implementation.  After setting out some of the relevant 
considerations, Part II then asks the authority question:  who should decide?  
I examine what the functional purposes and comparative strengths of the 
EU’s four principal organs (Parliament, Council, Commission, and Court) 
suggest about the role each should play in shaping the future streamlined 
EU-wide investment policy.  The final section concludes with a critical 
assessment of how much room the day-to-day exigencies of EU politics 
and bureaucracy leave for the kind of robust normative debate I propose.  
In my own circumspect but hopeful estimation, the answer is:  enough. 
I. WHERE SHOULD EU INVESTMENT POLICY GO NEXT? 
Contemplating the future can be alternately exciting, terrifying, or both.  
But if it is to be something other than stultifying, it must be done in a 
manner which allows the contemplator to develop a reasonably well 
conceived plan for moving from point A to point B.  This, of course, 
requires having at least a rough idea of where points A and B lie.  As with 
most other public policy matters, figuring out “where to next?” in 
European international investment policy requires looking at the question 
from three different angles:  past empirics, future goals, and practical 
implementation considerations.  I take each in turn. 
A. A question of empirics 
In order to determine where the EU should move next with its 
international investment agreements, it is first necessary to take stock of 
what its Member States have achieved in the past through their respective 
investment policies and treaties.  The principal documents released to-date 
by the Commission and the Council have evinced surprisingly little 
interest in this stock-taking exercise.  The Commission, in its communiqué 
titled “Towards a comprehensive European international investment 
policy,” set out the number of extant BITs maintained by EU Member 
States.
21
  It failed, however, to analyze the concrete impact of any of these 
BITs on European investors, EU Member States, or the European 
investment environment as a whole.  Instead, the Commission seems to 
have contented itself with two vague nods to a limited subset of the 
existing empirical literature on investment treaties.  The first directs the 
reader without comment to “the extensive analytical work performed by 
                                                 
21
 Commission – Towards a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 5, at p. 4 
(“the ‘BITs and pieces’ of investment policy”) and Annex (“Overview of the number of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties concluded by Member States). 
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international organizations such as [the] OECD and UNCTAD.”22  The 
second references a single study in support of the assertion that: 
 
[r]esearch confirms that substantive investment provisions 
in broad trade agreements impact trade and FDI flows more 
profoundly, or that the combination of substantive 
investment rules and provisions liberalising other parts of 
the economy jointly impact trade and investment more 
significantly.
23
 
 
The communiqué made no attempt to probe the possible policy-
making significance of the “or” in this quote.  Nor did it explain what the 
“extensive analytical work” by the OECD and UNCTAD actually reveals 
about the effectiveness of investment treaties.  (It turns out some of it is 
quite critical on certain points.
24
)  Much less did the communiqué refer to 
the many academic studies which have so far found no conclusive 
evidence of a positive causal relationship between international investment 
treaties and investment flows to the states that sign them.
25
   
The Council’s statement in response to the Commission’s 
communiqué proved even less searching on the empirical front.  It began 
with a sweeping acknowledgment of “the crucial role of foreign direct 
investment in fostering competitiveness, economic growth and 
productivity, strengthening trade relations between nations, contributing to 
sustainable development, job creation and enhanced consumer benefits”.26  
It made no attempt, however, to discover what is known about the precise 
role foreign direct investment plays in contributing to each of these noble 
goals.  In particular, it nowhere examined the relationship between these 
                                                 
22
 Id. at p. 4 (emphasis omitted). 
23
 Id. at p. 5 (citing OECD (2006), Analysis of the economic impact of investment 
provision in regional trade agreements, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 36, 
11.07.2006). 
24
 See e.g. UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (2012) 
(recommending a “new generation” of investment policies (p. 3) in part in reaction to 
what it describes on the publication website as “systemic flaws in the current system” (at: 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20%28II
A%29/IIA-IPFSD.aspx) (last visited 21 May 2013). 
25
 For an overview, see Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote 
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 
397 (2011) (summarizing the existing literature as concluding that investment treaties do 
not produce increases in investment inflows, and finding additionally that investment 
treaties do not factor into the decision-making processes of company executives when 
deciding whether to undertake foreign investments nor of risk insurers when calculating 
premiums for political risk insurance policies).  See also Jonathan Bonnitcha, The 
Economics of Investment Treaty Protection and the Evolving Empirical Research Agenda, 
Working Paper, at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138235 (suggesting future directions for 
empirical research that might shed light on important questions other than the relationship 
between investment treaties and investment flows).  
26
 Council – Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, para 
1. 
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objectives and the decision to conclude EU-wide investment treaties 
which provide foreign investors with extensive substantive legal 
protections backed by international arbitration.  Yet these fact-finding 
omissions did not deter the Council from authoritatively asserting that the 
EU’s future investment policy “should not negatively affect investor 
protection and guarantees enjoyed under the existing [bilateral investment] 
agreements” 27   and should, in fact, “increase the current level of 
protection and legal security for the European investor abroad.”28 
The European Parliament, for its part, did respond to the 
Commission’s communiqué with a more evaluative approach.  While it 
did not engage directly with any of the empirical studies mentioned above, 
it did begin its response with a series of stock-taking recitations in which it 
laid out some of the more problematic outcomes of states’ past investment 
treaty practices.
29
  It noted, for example, that while “inward investment 
can improve host countries’ competitiveness, outward investment 
sometimes necessitates adjustment assistance for low-skilled workers.”30  
It expressed concern that past BITs have “enabled some enterprises to file 
suits against their own countries”.31  It also took issue with the way in 
which past investment treaties have been interpreted and applied in 
practice, stating: 
 
a number of problems became clear because of the use of 
vague language in agreements being left open for 
interpretation, particularly concerning the possibility of 
conflict between private interests and the regulatory tasks 
of public authorities, for example in cases where the 
adoption of legitimate legislation led to a state being 
condemned by international arbitrators for a breach of the 
principle of “fair and equitable treatment”.32 
 
The Parliament followed this critique with a mention of the fact that the 
US and Canada have changed their model BITs in response to such 
outcomes.
33
   
 Of course, it is one thing to take note of existing problems and quite 
another to solve them.
34
  Many of the European Parliament’s concerns 
                                                 
27
 Id. at para 9. 
28
 Id. at para 8 (emphasis added). 
29
 Parliament – Resolution on a Future EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, paras A-J. 
30
 Id. at para C. 
31
 Id. at para E. 
32
 Id. at para G.  Unfortunately, the document does not cite to any specific investor-state 
awards which raised particular concerns for the European Parliament. 
33
 Id. at para H. 
34
 For example, Professor Reinisch rightly expresses skepticism about the Parliament’s 
vague suggestion that the EU’s future investment treaties should somehow distinguish 
between speculative investment and other forms of investment.  (Reinisch – Quo Vadis 
Europe?, supra note 2, p. 29.)  As risk-taking is inherent in all forms of investment 
8  Santa Clara J. Int’l L. __ 
 
 
cannot properly be addressed without more systematic empirical analysis 
of the issues raised – which the Parliament’s Resolution decidedly lacks.  
But based as they are upon anecdotal observations, the Parliament’s calls 
upon the Commission to review its intended policy direction in certain 
areas enjoy at least some empirical basis.  This stands in contrast to the 
Commission and Council documents to which it reacts.   
 It is therefore regrettable that the Commission initially responded to 
the Parliament’s calls for further analysis of key issues in a dismissive 
manner.  Consider, for example, how the Commission went about taking 
“due note of the [Parliamentary] Resolution’s request for the 
establishment of clear definitions of investor protection standards, in order 
to prevent international arbitrators from broadly interpreting investor 
protection clauses.” 35   After pompously asserting that “[a]ll these 
standards have been defined and implemented by international tribunals 
and courts for many decades now – some even for centuries,” 36  the 
Commission went on to assure the Parliament that the Commission 
“remains at its disposition for further explanations as to the content of 
specific standards that may raise concerns or uncertainty for the 
Parliament.”37  Such thinly veiled condescension seems unwarranted at 
best and intolerable at worst.  Even a cursory perusal of the Parliamentary 
Resolution reveals that Parliament’s concerns over vague investment 
treaty terms stem not from a lack of understanding of the applicable 
international legal standards but rather from a detailed knowledge of the 
widely varying and sometimes irreconcilable ways in which those 
standards have actually been applied by tribunals in practice.
38
   
 In fact, as the Commission well knows, there is a large and ever-
growing literature on the relationship between vague treaty terms and 
inconsistent decision-making by international tribunals.
39
  Scholars, 
arbitrators, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations like UNCTAD 
have put forth no shortage of suggestions for how to address such 
inconsistency problems within international investment law.
40
  It would be 
                                                                                                                         
activities, the Parliament would have to do a much better job of motivating its particular 
concerns before any informed decision concerning the EU’s future investment treaty 
definition of “investment” could be taken. 
35
 European Commission, Followup to the European Parliament Resolution on the future 
European international investment policy, adopted by the Commission on 5 July 2011, pp. 
4-5 [hereinafter “Commission – Follow up to the Parliament Resolution on the future 
European international investment policy”]. 
36
 Id, at p. 4. 
37
 Id, at p. 5. 
38
 Susan Frank, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 
(2005). 
39
 On the flexibility of treaty interpretation more generally, see Gerald Fitzmaurice, Vae 
Victis or Woe to the Negotiatiors! Your Treaty or Our “Interpretation” Of It?, 65 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 358 (1971). 
40
 Frank, supra note 38; Michael Waibel, International Investment Law and Treaty 
Interpretation, in FROM CLINICAL ISOLATION TO SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION, pp. 29-52, 
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very unfortunate indeed if the Commission, with the seeming 
encouragement of the Council,
41
 were to barrel ahead in forging a new 
EU-wide approach to international investment treaties that retains all of 
the known pathologies of the Member States’ old ones without first 
engaging in at least some level of critical reflection.   
 In certain areas, systematic empirical evidence is available to guide 
future investment policy-making.
42
  In other areas, anecdotal evidence 
may have to suffice.
43
  It seems incontrovertible, however, that evidence-
free policymaking is likely to lead to suboptimal outcomes and should not 
be allowed to carry the day.  Instead, Europeans have a reasonable right to 
expect that all of the EU’s responsible organs will inform themselves of 
both the positive and negative consequences of states’ past investment 
treaty-making practices before proceeding.  Then, armed with this 
improved knowledge, these organs bear a collective and individual duty to 
adjust plans for a future EU-wide international investment policy in 
accordance with the EU’s goals.  This brings us to the second set of 
considerations relevant to the present “where next?” query.  Namely, what 
exactly are the EU’s goals for its future international investment policy? 
B. A question of policy goals 
Just as figuring out where along the investment path the EU presently 
stands requires EU institutions to engage in an empirical stock-taking 
exercise, figuring out where the EU should head next requires it to 
conduct a robust normative debate to clarify the end goals of a shared EU 
international investment policy.  On one level this may seem like a simple 
task.  There are, after all, several common themes that emerge from the 
relevant documents promulgated by the Parliament, Commission, and 
Council so far.  In brief, these are:    
 
 A commitment to creating a level playing field among 
investors from all EU Member States, both with respect to their 
intra-EU and extra-EU investment activities;
44
 
                                                                                                                         
Hofmann, Rainer, Tams, C. Christian, eds. (Baden-Baden, 2011); UNCTAD, Investment 
Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, supra note 24; IISD Model 
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development: Negotiators’ 
Handbook, at: http://www.iisd.org/investment/capacity/model.aspx.  
41
 See Council – Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 16, 
which instructs the Commission to essentially pursue investment treaties very much 
along the lines of the most investor-friendly of the Member States’ 1990s era BITs. 
42
 Like the relationship between investment treaties and investment flows, discussed 
supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
43
 Eg concerning the various ways in which investment arbitration tribunals have 
interpreted vague treaty standards in the past. 
44
 There is, in this sense, a common goal of making the EU’s future investment policy 
consistent with the most fundamental principle of the EU internal market:  non-
discrimination.  Many commentators have argued that the existing intra-EU BITs violate 
this fundamental principle by affording preferential treatment within parts of the EU 
10  Santa Clara J. Int’l L. __ 
 
 
 A desire to create jobs, stimulate growth, and encourage 
sustainable economic development;
45
 and 
 A concern for preserving the right of the EU and its Member 
States to regulate in the public interest.
46
 
 
 It is difficult to take issue with any of these goals in the abstract; but as 
is often the case, the devil is in the details.  Upon closer inspection, it 
becomes clear that the Council is most interested in opening new markets 
to EU investors and increasing the level of legal protection enjoyed by EU 
investors abroad.
47
  The Parliament, by contrast, chiefly desires that the 
new EU investment policy have a “positive impact on growth and jobs not 
only in the EU but also in developing countries.”48  To that end it calls on 
the Commission to “maintain asymmetry in the EU’s trading relations 
with developing countries” 49  – a goal that is clearly at odds with the 
Council’s objective of obtaining preferential market access and privileged 
protections for EU investors.   
 In another major clash of goals, the Parliament aggressively seeks to 
protect the “the right of parties to [any EU investment] agreement to 
regulate, inter alia, in the areas of protection of national security, the 
environment, public health, workers’ and consumers’ rights, industrial 
policy and cultural diversity.” 50   The Council, on the other hand, 
prioritizes the overarching objectives in the inverse manner.  While 
stressing that the “European investment policy must continue to allow the 
EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce measures necessary to 
                                                                                                                         
internal market to some EU investors over others.  See e.g. Commission Staff Working 
Document on the free movement of capital in the EU, SWD(2013) 146 Final, (Brussels, 
15 May 2013), p.11(finding that “the Single Market for capital continues to be 
fragmented by existing Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) between certain Member 
States” and concluding that these BITs are contrary to EU law), at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/capital/docs/reports/130415_market-monitoring-
working-document_en.pdf.  
45
 As called for under the Consolidated TEU, supra note 2, art. 3(3) 
46
 See, e.g., Parliament – Resolution on a Future EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, 
paras 23-26 (on protecting the right to regulate) and Commission – Follow up to the 
Parliament Resolution on the future European international investment policy, supra note 
35, p. 5 (setting out the Commission’s stance on the right to regulate). 
47
 This is evident in the fact that the Council’s statement devotes 12 of its 19 paragraphs 
(paras 6-16, and 18) to advocating specific ways in which the Commission should 
aggressively pursue these two objectives while mentioning the need to preserve the right 
to regulate in furtherance of other public policy objectives only in non-committal terms in 
a single paragraph (para 17).  See Council – Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU 
Investment Policy, supra note 8. 
48
 Parliament – Resolution on a Future EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, at para J.7.  
See also para J.2 (seeking an investment policy which “promotes high-quality 
investments and makes a positive contribution to worldwide economic progress and 
sustainable development). 
49
 Id. at para 21. 
50
 Id. at para 25. 
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pursue public policy objectives”,51 it nevertheless insists that “the main 
focus… should continue to be effective and ambitious investment 
protection and market access.”52 
 The Commission has made some effort to stake out a middle ground 
between these two extremes.  Its main policy communication asserts that, 
while the future EU investment policy should be comprehensive and 
common, this does not entail a “one-size-fits-all model for investment 
agreements with 3
rd
 countries.” 53   In this respect the Commission’s 
position seems amenable to the Parliament’s objective of continuing the 
EU’s practice, in the trade realm, of extending special and differential 
treatment to developing countries.  But by the same token, it appears to 
run counter to the spirit of the Council’s first set of leaked negotiating 
directives to the Commission,
54
 since these instruct the Commission to 
negotiate essentially identical investment agreements with Canada, India 
and Singapore – three countries which are clearly not at the same level of 
development.   
 On other points, the Commission’s goals appear to be more closely 
aligned with the Council’s.  For example, it agrees with the Council’s 
assessment that “the Union should follow the available best practices to 
ensure that no EU investor would be worse off [under any new EU 
investment treaty] than they would be under Member States’ BITs.”55  
Still, there is a difference between the two positions in that the 
Commission’s main objective is “to deliver better results as a Union than 
the results that have been or could have been obtained by Member States 
individually.”56  The Commission thus seeks to be “guided by the best 
available standards” 57  previously developed by the Member States but 
evinces no intention to be constrained by them.
58
  The distinction is subtle 
but important. 
Overall, the question as to which policy goals the Commission will 
privilege over others remains an open one.  As noted above, the 
Commission’s initially dismissive response to the Parliament’s Resolution 
seemed to intimate that its ultimate priorities lie closer to those of the 
Council than to those of the Parliament.
59
  But recent moves suggest that 
                                                 
51
 Council – Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, para 
17. 
52
 Id. at para 16. 
53
 Commission – Towards a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 2, p. 6. 
54
 Council – Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 16. 
55
 Id. at p. 11.  Cf. also Council – Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, 
supra note 8, para 9. 
56
 Id. at p. 6. 
57
 Id. (emphasis added).  
58
 Of course, even identifying which of the Member States’ existing standards are the 
“best available” ones is problematic, given the considerable differences of opinion that 
exist across EU institutions and among Member States. 
59
 See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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the Commission has yet to make up its mind on certain key objectives.
60
  
According to yet another leaked document, the Commission’s proposed 
recommendation for a Council decision concerning the Commission’s 
negotiating mandate in the upcoming Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership Agreement (TTIP) negotiations with the U.S. includes 
language designed to calm fears about “excessive lawsuits challenging 
national legislation.”61  The draft includes a statement that an “[i]nvestor-
to-state dispute settlement mechanism should contain safeguards against 
frivolous claims,” and a specifies that “[t]he inclusion of investment 
protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement will depend on whether 
a satisfactory solution meeting EU interests... is achieved.”62 
What are we then to make of the confusing range of objectives set 
forth by the Council, the Parliament, and the Commission?  For one thing, 
as Professor Reinisch points out, it’s not yet entirely clear where the EU is 
heading with its investment policy.
63
  Given the dearth of evidentiary 
support in the articulation of all three institutions’ sets of policy goals,64 
it’s also not clear which positions deserve support over others.   Most 
importantly, though, what the persistence of these significant 
disagreements and vacillations underscores is that the EU has much more 
work to do in hammering out what its common policy goals in the 
international investment domain should be moving forward.   
At a minimum, a continued inter-institutional dialogue is called for – 
one that generates some mutually agreed means of either balancing or 
prioritizing among the three institutions’ competing policy visions.  Such a 
                                                 
60
 In addition to the developments described in this paragraph, see also the Commission’s 
presentation, “EU Investment Policy, STATE OF PLAY,” presented at a Civil Society 
Dialogue ad hoc meeting (Brussels, 15 April 2013), available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150853.pdf, which lists among 
the Commission’s “main concerns” the following items (slide 11): 
 Legitimate public measures (e.g. environment protection) challenged by 
investors as breaches of a broadly-defined FET or indirect expropriation  
 Insufficient transparency and predictability of ISDS [investor-state dispute 
settlement] 
 “Chilling effect” on the right to regulate or insufficient policy space for States. 
61
 Leaked Draft, “Presidency compromise proposal regarding the Commission's proposed 
Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations on a 
comprehensive trade and investment agreement, called the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, between the European Union and the United States of America 
(doc. 7396/13 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED),” EU Doc. No. DS 1353/1/13 REV 
1 (Brussels, 21 May 2013) [hereinafter “Leaked Draft – EU TTIP Negotiating Mandate”], 
para 22, available at: 
http://www.s2bnetwork.org/fileadmin/dateien/downloads/21st_May_DS1353_13_REV1.
pdf.  For an early press report on the leaked draft, see Reuters, EXCLUSIVE – EU Wants 
to Exclude Utilities from US Trade Talks, by Ethan Bilby (21 May 2013) [hereinafter 
Reuters – Exclusive], at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/21/eu-us-trade-
idUSL6N0E20QA20130521.  
62
 Leaked Draft – EU TTIP Negotiating Mandate, id. at para 21. 
63
 Reinisch – Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at p. 39 (Conclusions). 
64
 See infra, part I.A.  
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dialogue should ideally be allowed to run its course in advance of any 
further negotiations with third states.  Otherwise, the Commission risks 
negotiating new investment agreements with third countries which either 
the Council or Parliament will veto
65
 or which will be subject to challenge 
before the CJEU.
66
  Neither outcome would do much to contribute to the 
confidence of investors in the stability and predictability of EU investment 
law – a fact which could make the EU’s negotiating partners wary from 
the outset. 
The better course would be to make a serious attempt to narrow the 
obvious goal gaps between the Parliament and the Council before 
continuing down the path of treaty negotiations with key trading partners.  
This would of course entail some delay in the conclusion of new 
comprehensive trade and investment agreements with Canada, India, and 
Singapore – a prospect which prominent EU multinational companies will 
not relish.  Yet a delayed deal with these states may well be preferable to 
no deal, or worse yet, a bad deal.  Conversely, a good deal could smooth 
the way for speedier negotiations in the much higher stakes and much 
more politically fraught Transatlantic Partnership and China-EU 
Investment Agreement talks that are to follow.
67
  Either way, the bottom 
line is that the process of forging a minimal level of policy consensus has 
never been easy in any area of the EU’s ever-expanding competence, yet it 
                                                 
65
 The Council has the power to do this under art. 207(4) of the Consolidated TFEU, 
which places investment on the list of agreements subject to a special unanimity 
requirement.  See supra, note 14.  The source of the Parliament’s power of veto is not as 
easy to locate.  Art. 218(6)(a) of the TFEU specifies the circumstances in which the 
Parliament’s assent is required for international agreements.  In particular, art. 
218(6)(a)(v) requires Parliament’s assent for “agreements covering fields to which either 
the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure where 
consent by the European Parliament is required.”  However, it does not appear that the 
other provisions of the TFEU specifically make investment treaties subject to either the 
“ordinary legislative procedure” or the “special legislative procedure where consent by 
the European Parliament is required.”  Even so, authoritative commentaries on the topic 
appear to accept that the Parliament now enjoys a veto power over future EU investment 
treaties, and the Commission and Council also appear to be proceeding on this basis.  See 
e.g. Rudolf Mögele, ‘AEUV Art. 218’, in: Rudolf Streinz (ed), Beck’sche Kurz 
Kommentare, Band 57, EUV/AEUV, Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrage 
über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union (2
nd
 edition, Beck: München 2012) 2071-
80, para 18 and n 40 (relying on past practice to conclude that all commercial agreements 
of the Union fall under the Parliamentary consent requirement of art. 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU; 
and ANGELOS DIMOPOULOS, EU FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (Oxford University Press, 
2011), pp. 133-136 (reaching the same conclusion). 
66
 This is possible under art. 218(11) of the Consolidated TFEU, supra note 14. 
67
 Higher stakes because the TTIP deal would cover around “half of world economic 
output and a third of all trade” (Reuters – Exclusive, supra note 61), while investment 
flows between China and the EU are around $20 billion annually and rising (see 
Commission proposes to open negotiations for an investment agreement with China, 
Europa Rapid Press Release, Reference: IP/13/458 (23 May 2013), at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-458_en.htm).  The negotiations are more 
politically fraught because each requires a deal between two of the world’s three largest 
economies and most politically powerful negotiating blocks. 
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has always proven essential to the forward march of European 
harmonization.  There is no reason to expect international investment 
policy to be the exception. 
C. A question of implementation 
Shifting the focus to challenges of implementation brings in yet another 
set of factors which counsel in favor of slowing the train a bit.  As should 
be evident from the preceding discussions, without an empirically 
grounded understanding of what the Member States’ investment policies 
have accomplished in the past and a deliberatively generated minimum 
consensus on what a new EU policy should achieve in the future, any 
attempt to implement anything at all on a Union-wide level becomes an 
exercise in shooting in the dark.  This is aptly illustrated by the ongoing 
debate over how legal responsibility and financial liability for investor-
state arbitration claims should be divided between the EU and the affected 
Member State(s) in instances where such claims arise under future EU 
investment treaties. The Commission transmitted its proposed regulation 
on this topic to the Council and the Parliament in June of 2012.
68
   
 Without getting into the particulars of the Commission’s proposal,69 it 
would seem difficult to conceive of a sensible means of apportioning 
important rights of legal defense and significant financial liabilities among 
potential respondents without first knowing precisely what types of 
investor-state claims will be countenanced and what level of financial 
liability they may entail.  The attempt puts the proverbial cart before the 
horse.   
 This point has not been lost on the European Parliament.  In May of 
2013, the Parliament adopted several amendments to the Commission’s 
proposed responsibility sharing regulation.
70
  Notable among these was a 
                                                 
68
 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to 
investor-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to 
which the European Union is party, COM(2012) 335 final (Brussels, 21 June 2012) 
[hereinafter “Commission Proposal – Financial Responsibility”], available at:  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=EN&type
_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2012&nu_doc=335.  
69
 Not surprisingly, the proposal would grant the Commission extremely broad authority 
to dictate the legal defense to be mounted in any arbitration proceedings and to determine 
what portion of any ultimate liability finding should fall upon the fisc of the Member 
State concerned.  See id. 
70
 Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution, on the proposal for a regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for managing 
financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals established by 
international agreements to which the European Union is party, European Parliament Doc. 
No. A7-0124/2013 (26 March 2013) (Plenary sitting) [hereinafter “Draft European 
Parliament Legislative Resolution – Managing Financial Responsibility in ISDS”].  A 
side-by-side comparison of the Commission’s  proposed regulation and the Parliament’s 
amendments is available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-
0124&language=EN&mode=XML.   Note that this website contains the Parliamentary 
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revised opening recital paragraph which states that not all future EU 
investment agreements should necessarily provide for investor-state 
arbitration.
71
  Rather, the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement 
provisions, in the Parliament’s assertion, “should be a conscious and 
informed policy choice that requires political and economic justification” 
and “should be decided for each International Investment Agreement in 
the light of the particular circumstances.”72  The Parliament went on to 
insert into the proposed regulation two entirely new paragraphs designed 
to ensure that future EU investment agreements will: 
 
a) “afford foreign investors the same high but no higher level of 
protection” than that which is afforded to European investors under 
“Union law and the general principles common to the laws of the 
Member States”;73 
b) safeguard and not unduly constrain the Union’s legislative 
powers;
74
 and 
c) be consistent with the CJEU’s rulings on the limited international 
liability of the Union for its legislative acts.
75
 
  
 What is striking about these amendments is that they have nothing to 
do with the technicalities of dividing up legal and financial responsibilities 
between the EU and the Member States.  In point of fact, the Parliament 
expressed only minor quibbles with the Commission’s proposed approach 
                                                                                                                         
documents relating to the plenary session of 26 March 2013 (Ordinary legislative 
procedure: first reading).  The proposed amendments it lists were, however, formally 
adopted by the Parliament in a Plenary sitting on 23 May 2013 (Ordinary legislative 
procedure: second reading). 
71
 See id, Amendment 3, Proposal for a new regulation, Recital 2, which reads: “[i]n the 
cases where it is justifiable, future investment protection agreements concluded by the 
Union can include an investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism…” (emphasis in 
original).  The Parliament justified this amendment on the grounds that: 
…it is not a necessity to include ISDS provisions in future EU 
investment agreements and that their inclusion should be a conscious 
and informed policy choice that requires political and economic 
justification. Even if there is a general policy choice in favour, the 
question whether to include ISDS should be decided for each 
International Investment Agreement in the light of the particular 
circumstances. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
72
 Id. at “Justification.” 
73
 Id. at Amendment 4, Proposal for a regulation, Recital 3(a) (new) (emphasis omitted). 
74
 Id., at Amendment 5, Proposal for a regulation, Recital 3(b) (new). 
75
 Id (citing FIAMM and Fedon v. Council and Commission, [2008] ECR I-6513 and 
noting, in its “Justification,” that “[u]nless framed restrictively, EU investment treaties 
[could] thus allow arbitral tribunals to hold the Union liable to foreign investors for 
legislative acts where EU investors would have no claim under EU law” (emphasis in 
original). 
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on that front.
76
  The Parliament instead devoted the bulk of its energies to 
resurrecting what it evidently regards as a prematurely stifled policy 
debate.
77
  This move is quite understandable under the circumstances, and 
one can only hope that the Commission and the Council will sit up and 
take notice.    
 Of course, to highlight the Parliament’s ongoing hesitations is not to 
minimize the important preparatory work the Commission has already 
done.  There are numerous difficult implementation questions that must be 
worked out in order to allow the EU to move forward with adopting a 
comprehensive Union-wide investment policy.  What will become of the 
Member States’ existing BITs?  How much involvement will the Member 
States have in negotiations over the new BITs that are slated to replace 
their old ones?
78
  How will the EU deal with the fact that the ICSID 
Convention welcomes only states, and not supranational organizations, as 
contracting parties?
79
  Even outside the ICSID context, how will legal and 
financial responsibility be handled when future investor-state arbitration 
claims arise?  The Commission itself has taken the lead in identifying 
these and many other complex challenges.  It deserves credit for deploying 
its formidable technical expertise to begin sorting through them, and I 
have no doubt that its efforts will eventually succeed.   
 The larger point, however, is that since responsibility for European 
investment policymaking has shifted with the Lisbon Treaty, the 
implementation process must morph along with it.  This requires stepping 
back to discern which technical problems can be addressed in advance of 
achieving an inter-institutional consensus on policy goals and which ones 
cannot.  It makes little sense to propose a technical regulation which, in 
effect, implements the policy vision of one institution when it is known in 
advance that a second institution with a conflicting policy vision must also 
provide its assent before the regulation can be adopted.  On the other hand, 
asking the Commission to sit on its hands while the Parliament and the 
Council battle it out hardly seems ideal either.  In the next part, I therefore 
consider what role each of the four major EU institutions can and should 
productively play in the process of creating and refining the Union’s new 
comprehensive international investment policy. 
                                                 
76
 See, e.g., id, at Amendment 6, recital 4; Amendment 7, recital 6; Amendment 9, recital 
8; Amendment 10, recital 10, etc. (all proposing only minor changes to the Commission’s 
text). 
77
 Id, at Amendments 3-5, 8, 19, 24, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 35, 43 (all proposing major 
additions or changes to the Commission’s text). 
78
 See Reinisch – Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at part II (discussing the idea of EU 
investment treaties as “mixed agreements” to be negotiated jointly by the Commission 
and the Member States). 
79
 The EU’s recent experience with negotiating the accession of the Union to the 
European Convention on Human Rights can no doubt provide lessons on how to 
approach this problem.  See PAUL GRAGL, THE ACCESSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Hart Publishing 2013). 
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II. WHO SHOULD DECIDE?  FOUR VOICES, ONE EUROPE 
Deciding who should do what in a policymaking context is not only a 
question of legal competence but also of comparative advantage.  Each of 
the institutions that play a major part in shaping Europe’s future 
international investment policy brings different institutional strengths and 
weaknesses to the table.  These strengths and weaknesses should serve as 
signposts for working out how the new EU policy takes shape in practice.  
In discussing them, I will follow a traditional legal ordering schema, 
moving from legislative to executive to judicial functions in sequence. 
A. Community-wide democratic vetting in the European Parliament 
The European Parliament was singled out to be one of the clear 
winners under the Lisbon Treaty’s amendments to the Union’s 
institutional operating structure.
80
  Indeed, it is worth recalling that a 
major driver of the successive rounds of EU treaty reform over the past 
two decades has been a push to reduce the EU’s much bemoaned 
democratic deficit.
81
  This makes it felicitous that the outcome of the 
Lisbon Treaty, insofar as it concerns foreign investment policy, is not only 
that that the EU has acquired the competence to craft an integrated EU-
wide policy on behalf of its Member States but also that the European 
Parliament now plays a significant role in shaping the new policy. 
As noted above, the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty brought foreign 
direct investment within the scope of the EU’s Common Commercial 
                                                 
80
 Among other things, the Lisbon Treaty augmented the Parliament’s powers by bringing 
more than 40 new fields under the co-decision procedure by which the Parliament and the 
Council now jointly exercise decision-making authority.  The Treaty also gives 
Parliament the final say on the EU budget.  As explained by European Parliament 
President Jerzy Buzek: 
The Treaty gives a huge boost to the powers of the European Parliament. The 
rise in legislative powers for the European Parliament represents almost a 
doubling in power.  One key area of increased power is the Common 
Agricultural Policy.  MEPs for the first time will decide on agricultural 
expenditure hitherto almost exclusively controlled by national agricultural 
ministries.  Agricultural spending counts for almost 40% of the EU budget.  
MEPs will also have an equal say with ministers on the way the EU's structural 
funds are shaped and spent.  Our European Parliament committees are 
responsible for nearly 100 percent of EU legislation, having great power in their 
hands. 
Statement by EP President Jerzy Buzek on the Lisbon Treaty (2009), available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/lisbon_treaty/statement_ep_president_EN.pdf.  
81
 For an overview, see Giandomenico Majone, Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”: The 
Question of Standards, 4(1) EUROPEAN L.J. 5-28 (1998); Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence 
of the “Democratic Deficit”: Reassessing the Legitimacy of the European Union, 40(4) J. 
OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 603-34 (2002); Andreas Føllesdal & Simon Hix, Why 
There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone & Moravcsik, 44(3) J. OF 
COMMON MARKET STUDIES 533-62 (2006); and Youri Devuyst, The European Union's 
institutional balance after the Treaty of Lisbon: “community method” and “democratic 
deficit' reassessed”, 39(2) GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L. 247-325 (2008). 
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Policy (CCP), which is subject to the so-called “ordinary legislative 
procedure.”82  The legal import of this change is that the Parliament and 
the Council must henceforth act jointly in adopting the EU’s future 
investment treaties and also in enacting the internal regulatory framework 
which will govern their implementation within the Union.
83
  Viewed from 
the perspective of comparative institutional strengths, it becomes evident 
that the Parliament and the Council have different roles to play in 
exercising this shared competence.   
Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by citizens 
within EU Member States.
84
  Their principal task is to represent the 
interests of their constituencies in the enactment of EU-wide legislation.
85
  
In the realm of investment, the European Parliament functions as a 
democratic deliberative body which ensures that the various policy 
concerns voiced by its diffuse constituencies in respect of Member States’ 
past investment policies are addressed in any new EU-wide policy.  So far, 
the Parliament appears to be taking its expanded representative 
responsibilities in this area quite seriously.  This much is evident from the 
above discussion of the Parliament’s recent amendments to the 
Commission’s proposed regulation on managing the financial 
responsibility of the Union and the Member States under future EU 
investment treaties. 
Given that the Parliament’s very purpose is to protect the interests of 
EU citizens, it is puzzling that some commentators within the investment 
arbitration community appear to view the Parliament’s active efforts to 
shape the new EU investment policy as somehow inappropriate or 
obstructionist.
86
  One can only hope that this sentiment will wane with 
time as the relevant actors become more accustomed to Parliamentary 
involvement in this area of the EU’s external relations.87   
                                                 
82
 Supra note 11. 
83
 For the legal basis of the Parliament’s powers, see the explanation supra, note 65 
(discussing the combined impact of arts 207(1), 207(2), 207(4), and 218(6)(a)(v) on the 
legal competence of the Parliament and the Council, respectively, in the area of foreign 
direct investment).  
84
 Art. 14(3) Consolidated TEU and art. 223(1) Consolidated TFEU, both supra note 2,  
85
 The Parliament thus serves a function similar to that of the House of Representatives in 
the U.S. domestic lawmaking context. 
86
 OGEMID subscribers will recall that the above-discussed Parliamentary amendments 
to the Commission’s proposed financial responsibility regulation (see discussion in part 
I.C., infra) were greeted with scathing criticism by many members of the OGEMID 
community.  For those who are not familiar with it, OGEMID is the principle electronic 
listserve followed by the community of investment arbitration practitioners and scholars.  
Since OGEMID operates under the Chatham House Rule, I cannot quote any of the 
specific comments here. 
87
 To the extent that the objection is that Parliament is insufficiently informed about the 
relevant issues, the better approach would be to take direct action to educate 
Parliamentarians and thereby do away with any knowledge deficit.  For an example of 
such productive engagement, see Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Managing financial 
responsibility for investor claims under EU investment agreements: Comments on the 
Commission proposal for a Regulation – COM(2012) 335 final1 and Professor Tietje’s 
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In my own view, the Parliament’s strong push for a re-evaluation of 
some of the international investment regime’s central articles of faith 
should be welcomed with open arms.  Whether or not one agrees with any 
of its specific reform proposals, the Parliament’s refusal to rubber stamp 
and simply transpose onto the EU level the past bilateral investment treaty 
practices of certain influential Member States has generated positive 
results.  It has opened up space for a genuine and much needed dialogue 
about the goals of international investment policy and a critical appraisal 
of the successes and failures of past efforts.  The Parliament’s cautious 
approach thus deserves praise rather than condemnation.  But approbation 
considerations aside, what seems unarguable is that the European 
Parliament understands both its powers and its duties in the new EU 
investment policy-making arena.  EU citizens may take heart in observing 
that the Parliament so far appears committed to doing its job. 
B. Member State checks and balances at the Council of the European 
Union 
Turning then to the Council, can the same generally positive 
assessment be made of its efforts to-date, in light of its institutional 
strengths?  As explained on its website, “[t]he Council is the EU 
institution where the Member States’ government representatives sit, i.e. 
the ministers of each Member State with responsibility for a given area.”88  
The Council’s remit includes the authority to adopt “legislative acts 
(Regulations, Directives, etc.), in many cases [including international 
investment policy] in ‘co-decision’ with the European Parliament.”89  The 
EU treaties establish the number of votes each Member State can cast 
within the Council.
90
  They also determine the circumstances in which the 
Council may act by simple majority as opposed to when it must act by 
qualified majority or unanimity.
91
  When it comes to adopting an EU-wide 
international investment policy, the unanimity requirement applies.
92
 
                                                                                                                         
study on the draft Regulation [hereinafter “Kleinheisterkamp – Comments on Managing 
Financial Responsibility”] available at:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2222580. 
88
 Website of the Council of the European Union, at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/council?lang=en.   Note that the Council of the 
European Union is designated in short form in the EU treaties as “the Council.”  There is 
also a separate body called “the European Council” which the treaties always refer to by 
its full name.  This latter body is comprised of the Member States’ sitting heads of state 
and is responsible for setting the general policy direction of the Union.  Unlike the 
Council, however, it does not exercise any direct legislative authority. 
89
 Id. 
90
 Loosely speaking, the formula allocates more votes to Member States with larger 
populations, but the correspondence is not straightforward.  The economic and political 
prominence of certain Member States and their historical role within the Union are also 
taken into account.  Hence Italy and Germany each receive 29 votes (even though 
Germany’s population exceeds Italy’s by 22 million), but Spain (whose population lags 
that of Italy by less than 13 million) receives only 27 votes. 
91
 The basic functions of the Council are set forth in article 16 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), while the manner in which the Council goes about fulfilling its functions is 
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Unlike Members of the European Parliament, Council Members are 
not directly elected by citizens but are instead appointed to the Council by 
the governments of their respective home states.
93
  Their democratic 
mandate is thus a couple of steps further removed from the electorate than 
is the case with the European Parliament.
94
  The Council does, 
nevertheless, enjoy two comparative institutional advantages over the 
Parliament when it comes to international investment policy-making.   
The first is subject matter-specific diplomatic expertise at the 
intergovernmental level.  Members of the European Parliament are 
legislative generalists.  Their mandate is to forge a pan-European 
regulatory consensus that will prove acceptable to their constituents on 
matters ranging from immigration to agricultural policy.  The Council, by 
contrast, sits in “configurations” organized by subject matter.95  Council 
decisions concerning international investment policy are led by executive 
branch officials from the Member States who sit together within the 
Foreign Affairs Configuration, and specifically, by high level officials 
sitting within the Trade Policy Committee (Services and Investment).
96
  
These officials bring to the Committee a considerable level of collective 
diplomatic expertise in negotiating matters involving international 
investment law and policy.
97
  As a result, they may be better placed than 
                                                                                                                         
specified in articles 237 to 243 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).  Article 3 of Protocol 36 (on Transitional Provisions) specifies the current voting 
rights allocations exercised by the Member States within the Council.  This number 
ranges from 3 votes on the low end (Malta) to 29 on the high end (Germany, France, Italy, 
and UK).  To access all of the relevant texts, see Consolidated versions of the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Council of the European Union, 
Doc. No. 6655/7/08 REV 7 (Brussels, 12 December 2012), at: 
http://consilium.europa.eu/documents/treaty-of-lisbon?lang=en.  
92
 Art. 207(4) Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2. 
93
 Art 16(2) Consolidated TEU, supra note 2 
94
 Of course, national governments are directly elected by citizens in all EU Member 
States, and it is these governments which appoint their executive branch Ministers to 
serve on the Council.  The individual Council Members in this sense enjoy a certain 
degree of democratic legitimacy as representatives of their countries’ elected 
governments.  The democratic legitimacy of the Council as a whole is nevertheless 
limited by the fact that its members are not directly elected to represent their countries in 
a generalized EU-wide legislative role but are rather appointed to ministerial posts in 
their home states and then seconded to the Council for specific purposes. 
95
 Art. 16(6) Consolidated TEU and art. 236 Consolidated TFEU, both supra note 2. 
96
 Information about the Council’s Committee Structure may typically be found on the 
website of the Presidency of the Council, which rotates to a different Member State every 
six months.  At the time of this writing, the Council presidency was held by Ireland.  The 
relevant website explaining the Council’s committee structure for January through June 
of 2013 was thus accessible at:  http://eu2013.ie/ireland-and-the-
presidency/abouttheeu/theeuexplained/councilworkingparties/. 
97
 The Parliament also develops substantial subject-matter expertise through its 
committee structure.  In the investment realm, the Committee on International Trade 
(known as INTA) is the dominant player.  Nevertheless, the expertise advantage I 
highlight here is diplomatic.  Consistent with their legislative function, most members of 
INTA will take a legislative/regulatory view of international investment law (the 
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many Parliamentarians to set realistic policy boundaries within which the 
Commission stands a good chance of concluding successful treaty 
negotiations with other countries in practice. 
The Council’s second institutional strength in this realm is its unique 
ability to safeguard the interests of individual Member States against any 
potential “tyranny of the majority.”  While Parliamentary decisions 
concerning EU investment policy are taken by a simple majority, the 
TFEU imposes the special unanimity requirement upon all Council 
decisions taken within this area.  Stronger, larger, and more historically 
influential states within the EU are thereby prohibited – at least in theory – 
from riding roughshod over the wishes of weaker, smaller, or newer 
Member States.   
In light of these two institutional strengths, it seems pertinent to ask 
how the Council might go about capitalizing on its comparative 
advantages in its role as co-legislator overseeing the development of the 
EU’s future comprehensive international investment policy.  
With respect to the latter strength, the equalizing effect of the 
Council’s special unanimity requirement has important implications given 
the Member States’ differential experiences with their past investment 
treaty practices.  The Member States which, prior to the passage of the 
Lisbon Treaty, entered into the largest numbers of bilateral investment 
treaties were:  Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, 
Belgium/Luxembourg, and Italy.
98
  This list contains all of the founding 
members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).
99
  It also 
includes all of the EU’s present day economic powerhouse states save 
Spain.  Yet the list has almost no overlap with the list of EU countries that 
have faced serious investor-state arbitration claims under BITs.  Germany 
and Belgium are only now facing their first colorable investor-state 
claims,
100
 while the other founding countries have yet to face any.
101
   
                                                                                                                         
advantages of which I highlighted in the previous section).  In contrast, many of the 
executive branch ministers who serve on the Council’s Trade Policy Committee (Services 
and Investment) have participated in inter-governmental negotiations over international 
investment agreements on behalf of their home countries and/or have been involved in 
responding to investor-state legal claims lodged under such agreements.  This imbues 
them with an inevitably different, though ideally complementary, viewpoint. 
98
 Commission – Towards a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 5 at p. 12 
(Annex). 
99
 The ECSC was established in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris, to which West Germany, 
France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy were party.  See Treaty 
Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 18 April 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, 
entered into force 23 July 1952.  Expired 23 July 2002. 
100
 See Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12 
(award pending); Vattenfall Launches Second Claim Against Germany, GLOB. ARB. REV. 
News (June 25, 2012), available at 
www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/30634/vattenfall-launches-second-claim-
against-germany/; and Alyx Barker, Belgium Faces ICSID Claim from Chinese Investors, 
GLOB. ARB. REV. (Sep. 24, 2012).   
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By contrast, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia have all had to respond 
to multiple claims by foreign investors, some of which have led to large 
damages awards against them.
102
  One might expect these very different 
experiences with investor-state dispute settlement to lead Member States 
to adopt different positions within the Council when it comes to the EU’s 
future international investment policy.   
For example, there is good reason to suppose that the Czech Republic, 
which has already faced 20 investor-state arbitration claims, might want 
the Council to be a bit more specific in its policy communications than 
simply stating that the EU’s new policy should “continue to allow the EU 
and the Member States to adopt and enforce measures necessary to pursue 
public policy objectives.”103  Such a general statement sheds little light on 
the most pressing challenge that the Commission will face when 
negotiating with other countries.  That is, how, precisely, should public 
policy prerogatives be better protected in future EU agreements with third 
states?  In light of its wealth of experience responding to investor-state 
claims triggered by public policy measures, Czech officials might be 
thought to have developed strong views on the matter.  Moreover, given 
its effective right of veto over Council decisions in this area, one might 
expect to see the Czech Republic’s representatives flex their muscles a bit 
more here than in other matters.  The same goes for the other Member 
States that have accrued experience in responding to investor-state claims.   
Yet surprisingly, there appears to have been little concerted debate 
surrounding this or other controversial issues within the Council so far.   
To the contrary, nothing in the Council’s conclusions on the 
Commission’s original investment policy proposal,104 or in its first set of 
leaked negotiating directives to the Commission,
105
 evinces any kind of 
dissension within the Council’s ranks.  Council Members instead seem to 
have united around a common mission of securing “effective and 
ambitious investment protection and market access”106 for EU investors.107  
The intriguing question is, why? 
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 According to UNTAD, claims have also been lodged against the UK, France, Italy, 
and Spain.  However, it is doubtful whether any of these claims was even remotely 
colorable, as there is no publicly available information to suggest that any of them ever 
reached the stage of the constitution of an actual arbitral tribunal.  See UNCTAD, Recent 
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), IIA Issues Note, No. 1 (May 
2013), Annex 2 (“Known Investment treaty claims, by respondents”).   
102
 Id. 
103
 Council – Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, para 
17. 
104
 Id. 
105
 Council – Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 16. 
106
 Council – Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, para 
16.  See also Council – Negotiating Directives (Canada, India and Singapore), supra note 
16 (instructing the Commission to aim to include eight specific investor protection 
standards, backed by investor-state arbitration). 
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One answer may be that the Council simply trusts the Commission to 
hammer out the details in an appropriate manner.  This explanation could 
dovetail with the first of the Council’s two comparative institutional 
strengths.  That is, perhaps, in light of their diplomatic expertise, the 
Council Members think it better not to hamstring the Commission in 
advance with too detailed a policy agenda or too constrictive a negotiating 
mandate.  But if preserving the Commission’s negotiating flexibility is 
truly the goal, the Council is pursuing its aim rather selectively.  After all, 
it did instruct the Commission to make eight specific, BIT-derived 
investor protection standards – backed by investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms – “the main pillars of future EU investment agreements”.108 
A second possible explanation is less generous but perhaps more 
probable.  It is often the case that an institution’s relative strengths also 
entail relative weaknesses.  Here, the Trade Policy Committee’s 
specialized knowledge could act as a double-edged sword.  It could 
encourage myopic decision-making processes that pursue investor 
protection goals to the exclusion of competing policy considerations.  This 
potential institutional weakness is structurally mitigated within the 
Council by the fact that all final decisions are vetted and adopted by the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives.
109
  Unlike the Trade Policy 
Committee, this Committee is comprised of the Member States’ 
permanent ambassadors to the EU, who are accountable not to their 
respective countries’ trade ministers but to their heads of government. 
In practice, however, the degree to which final Council decisions 
prioritize trade and investment issues versus competing policy concerns 
may depend upon the level of influence exerted upon each Member State’s 
home government by the pro-trade and pro-investment lobbies relative to 
other powerful lobbies, such as workers’ unions, human rights advocates, 
environmental organizations, and the like.  If public choice theorists are 
correct in suggesting that significant power differentials exist across the 
two types of lobbies,
110
 this could help explain why the Council has so far 
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 In respect of the Leaked Draft – EU TTIP Negotiating Mandate, supra note 61, it is 
noteworthy that all of the language providing greater protection for public policy 
regulations enacted by the EU and its Member States was proposed by the Commission, 
not by the Council’s Trade Policy Committee.  As of this writing, it appears that the 
Presidency of the Council has not recommended that this language be struck from the 
Council’s final negotiating directives to the Commission, but it remains to be seen what 
the full Council will make of the proposed draft when it meets to consider the matter. 
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 Council – Conclusions on a Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, at 
para 14. 
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 This Committee is known as COREPER II.  A basic description of the Committee and 
its functions may be found at: http://europa.eu/newsroom/calendar/event/291099/coreper-
ii.  
110
 Some classic works include: Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among 
Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98(3) QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
371-400 (1983); Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 
64(3) AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 291-303 (1974); James M. Buchanan, The Domain 
of Constitutional Economics, 1(1) CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 1-18 (1990); 
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placed a strong emphasis on pushing detailed investor protection standards 
while generating only vague nods in the direction of preserving 
governmental regulatory space.
111
   
The EU investment policy saga could yet hold a surprising twist in 
store for its followers at the Council level, though.  This is because lobby-
based power dynamics often generate unconventional outcomes in 
institutional environments requiring unanimous decision-making.
112
  
While fans of the Council’s current policy direction must maintain the 
support of 27 Member States in order to continue the present inertia, 
opponents need only convince a single Member State to shift course in 
some material way in order to force a Council-wide re-alignment.
113
   The 
situation calls to mind the experience of the OECD Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment.
114
  In the mid-1990s, its eventual adoption 
seemed all but assured by the overwhelming support of the business 
community and the strong commitment of the negotiating governments.  
But in the end, the entire agreement unraveled after a successful civil 
society campaign convinced France to withdraw its support.
115
   
What this analysis suggests is that it is still too early to conclude that 
the Council will remain steadfast on its present course in forging the EU’s 
comprehensive international investment policy.  Potential veto threats 
emanating from the European Parliament and perhaps, in future, from 
within the Council itself may well force the Council to make some 
concessions.  But there is no reason why the Council need await the 
materialization of such threats before acting.   
                                                                                                                         
Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities, 90(5) 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 988-1002 (1982). 
111
 An ancillary to this explanation is that stronger states may be able to put various kinds 
of pressure on weaker states to go along with a particular policy.  Thus, to the extent that 
a lobby can successfully get the governments of the stronger states on board with its 
preferred policies, it may not have to lobby the weaker governments directly. 
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 This has been the source of much debate within the WTO, with commentators fearing 
that the Doha Development Round of negotiations may never reach a conclusion if the 
WTO’s “single undertaking” principle and its consensus-based decision-making norm are 
retained.  See, e.g. Joost Pauwelyn, New Trade Politics for the 21st Century, 11 J. OF 
INT’L ECONOMIC L. 559 (2008); and Richard Baldwin, 21st Century Regionalism: Filling 
the Gap between 21st Century Trade and 20th Century Trade Rules, CEPR Policy 
Insights No. 56, May 2011, available at: 
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/policyinsights/PolicyInsight56.pdf. 
113
 Indeed, I would be surprised if savvy civil society organizations weren’t either already 
making or preparing to make concerted efforts to influence the voting patterns of one or 
two Member State governments within the Council.  In light of all of the public reporting 
on investor-state arbitration claims, identifying which Member States are particularly 
vulnerable to civil society lobbying efforts and which officials within those governments 
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 The OECD maintains a website repository of the documentation related to the 
negotiations at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/index.htm.  
115
 For a brief history of the episode, see Katia Tieleman, The Failure of the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) and the Absence of a Global Public Policy Network, 
Working Paper, UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks (2005), at: 
http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/Tieleman_MAI_GPP_Network.pdf  
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Instead, when crafting its next round of policy statements and 
negotiating directives for the Commission, the Council can and should 
take concrete steps to explicitly address the major criticisms that have 
been leveled against some of the Member States’ past investment treaty 
practices.  These criticisms are well-known.
116
  It is therefore reasonable 
to expect the Council to engage with them at the same level of specificity 
as in its pronouncements concerning investor protection standards.  In 
doing so, the Council can put to good use the considerable diplomatic 
expertise of its Trade Policy Committee and the numerous investor-state 
dispute resolution experiences of some of its Member States.  This, in turn, 
promises to generate more feasible ways of making necessary adjustments 
to the EU’s future investment treaty-making practices than might 
otherwise emerge from Parliamentary proposals alone.   
Let us hope that the Council will rise to the challenge.  If it does, the 
EU’s new comprehensive international investment policy stands a good 
chance of outperforming the past policies of the individual Member States 
– which was, after all, the main reason behind the decision to transfer 
competency over investment policy to the EU in the first place.  At a more 
fundamental level, the international investment arena affords the Member 
States a critical opportunity to contribute, through the Council, to the 
maturation of the European Union.  By fully embracing its new post-
Lisbon Treaty role as co-legislator with the Parliament, the Council can 
reaffirm its commitment not only to European cooperation, but to 
European democracy. 
C. Executive coordination through the European Commission 
Moving next to the European Commission, what light can its comparative 
institutional strengths shed on the role it ought to play in the forging of the 
new EU comprehensive investment policy?  First, a few words about the 
structure of the Commission are in order.  The Commission is comprised 
at its highest level by 27 Commissioners who are appointed (one by each 
Member State) to sit in the College of Commissioners.  At the outset of his 
or her term, the President of the Commission
117
 assigns specific portfolios 
to each Commissioner.  These portfolios reflect the areas in which the EU 
is competent to act on behalf of the Member States.  The individual 
Commissioners then take responsibility for directing the Commission’s 
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 For a comprehensive discussion of the various critiques and some proposed solutions, 
see UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements:  Key Issues, vols. I-III 
(UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/10) (01 Dec 2004, 17 May 2005, and 30 June 2005, 
respectively), all available at:  http://unctad.org/en/pages/publications/Intl-Investment-
Agreements---Issue-Series-I.aspx.  See also THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, (Michael Waibel, ed. 2010). 
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 The President is nominated by the European Council (that is, the heads of all of the 
Member State governments) acting by a qualified majority.  He or she must then be 
formally elected to office by the European Parliament acting by an absolute majority.  
Each President serves a five-year term, and may be re-elected to a second term.  For 
details, see art 17(7) Consolidated TEU, supra note 2. 
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activities in particular subject matter areas such as trade, agriculture, and 
energy.
118
 
 Like members of the Council, the Commissioners are initially 
nominated by their home governments.  Unlike the Council, however, the 
Commission serves a fixed five-year term so that its composition does not 
fluctuate along with national election results in each Member State.
119
  
The fixed term helps to secure the Commissioners in their mandate to 
serve the Union as a whole rather than the interests of their home states.  
In addition, the makeup of the entire Commission – including the portfolio 
assignments made by the President – must be approved by the European 
Parliament before it can take office.
120
  The Commission’s Director-
General of Trade (who now oversees investment policy as well) is 
therefore vetted by the Parliament’s Committee on International Trade 
before being voted into office by a majority of the full Parliament.
121
  The 
democratic imprimatur which the Commission receives from the 
Parliamentary confirmation process is important, since the Commission 
exercises extensive powers under the EU treaties.   
 In terms of its functions within the investment domain in particular, 
the Commission enjoys the exclusive right to initiate EU legislation 
regulating cross-border investments.
122
  This power is best understood as 
quasi-legislative in that the Commission cannot actually adopt any 
legislation on its own – such power being reserved to the Parliament and 
the Council as co-legislators.
123
  The Commission’s other investment-
related powers are executive in nature.  It is tasked with negotiating 
investment treaties with third states,
124
 implementing and overseeing the 
enforcement of the Union’s investment regulations and treaty 
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 A list of the Commission’s Departments (Directorates-General) and Services may be 
found at: http://ec.europa.eu/about/ds_en.htm.  
119
 Also unlike Council members, Commissioners are appointed to act on behalf of the 
Union rather than on behalf of their home states.  They are therefore required to be 
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122
 Indeed, the Commission has exclusive authority to propose legislation in most areas of 
the EU’s competence.  This power, known as the right of initiative, emanates from art. 
17(2), Consolidated TEU, supra note 2. 
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 See the discussion infra, parts II.A & B. 
124
 Upon authorization from the Council.  See Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, art 
218(1)-(4). 
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obligations,
125
 and defending the Union in any legal disputes brought 
against it in consequence of such regulations and treaty obligations.
126
 
 These structural features, duties, and powers suggest a couple of 
comparative institutional strengths upon which the Commission can draw 
in developing the EU’s new comprehensive international investment 
policy.    First, the Commission possesses an unparalleled level of 
technical expertise when it comes to negotiating and implementing pan-
European economic treaties – principally trade agreements. 127   It has 
likewise accumulated a wealth of experience in defending against state-to-
state claims before the WTO.
128
  While international investment law and 
policy present distinctive challenges that are absent from the trade context 
(the possibility of investor-state claims being paramount among them), the 
Commission’s extensive experience with the latter nonetheless gives it 
significant insight into the former.   
 Second, the Commission has been building up its investment expertise 
for some years through its direct involvement in several areas of 
investment policymaking.  In particular, it has: 
  
 spoken for the EU in its status as a party to the Energy Charter 
Treaty;
129
  
 successfully130 and unsuccessfully131 challenged portions of certain 
Member States’ BITs before the CJEU;  
 submitted amicus curiae briefs to arbitration tribunals presiding 
over BIT-based investor-state claims against Member States;
132
 
 represented the EU in investment-related negotiations within the 
WTO;
133
 and 
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accompanying text. 
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 See European Commission, Memo, The EU’s Free Trade Agreements, Where Are 
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I-10889. 
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Commission Seeks to Intervene as Amicus Curiae in ICSID Arbitrations to Argue that 
Long-term Power Purchase Agreements Between Hungary and Foreign Investors are 
Contrary to European Community Law, INV. ARB. REP., Sept. 17, 2008, at 14. 
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 participated as an observer in the investment policymaking and 
standard-setting activities of several other intergovernmental 
bodies.
134
 
 
 This broad exposure, in combination with its deep expertise in the 
trade realm, makes the Commission better placed than any other EU 
institution to engineer the smooth functional integration of the EU’s future 
trade and investment policies.  The Commission’s new competence to 
negotiate both types of treaties arrives not a moment too soon.  While 
most international investment issues still remain outside the formal ambit 
of the WTO, there is an undeniable and accelerating worldwide trend 
toward concluding integrated regional trade and investment agreements.
135
   
 The Commission’s nearly two decades of experience with trade 
negotiations gives it a clear informational advantage in this environment.  
Thanks to its familiarity with the policy preferences and negotiating 
strategies of its trading partners, the Commission is in a better position 
than either the Council or the Parliament to assess how investment and 
trade provisions can and cannot (and should and should not) be linked 
within the next-generation of hybrid agreements.  It also knows more 
about what the EU’s negotiating partners are and are not likely to accept in 
terms of trade-offs between investment and trade concessions.  Now that 
the EU is able to put both topics on the table simultaneously, the 
Commission can play a productive role in anticipating and proposing 
concrete ways in which each might best be played off against the other. 
 Beyond just contributing its technocratic expertise at the level of 
negotiations and implementation, however, the Commission has a vital 
role to play in shaping the normative orientation of the EU’s 
comprehensive international investment policy.  Thanks to its legislative 
right of initiative, the Commission enjoys a first-mover advantage in 
setting the terms of the policy debate.  It has already thrice made use of 
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 Such as discussions surrounding the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) 
agreement. 
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 For example, the Commission represents the EU as an observer before investment-
related bodies such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
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regional trading blocs.  Its newest manifestations may be seen in the negotiations toward 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) (see current status of the negotiations at:  
http://www.ustr.gov/tpp) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
Agreement (TTIP) (see announcement of impending negotiations at: 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/february/US-EU-TTIP).   As 
noted above (supra note 16), the EU is meanwhile working to conclude comprehensive 
trade and investment agreements with Canada, India, and Singapore. 
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this advantage:  first, in communicating to the Parliament and the Council 
a proposed framework for the new EU investment policy;
136
 second, in its 
proposed regulation on transitional arrangements for Member States’ BITs 
with third states (since adopted);
137
 and third, in its proposed regulation on 
managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute 
settlement.
138
   
 The first mover advantage gives the Commission a unique opportunity 
to lead, rather than follow, by contributing innovative ideas to the policy 
discussion.  The Commission is nevertheless constrained in pressing this 
advantage by its position as middleman between the Council and the 
Parliament.
139
  Unfortunately, the above discussion of the Parliament’s 
strong pushback against the Commission’s proposed financial 
responsibility regulation suggests that the Commission has not always 
been sufficiently mindful of this go-between role.  The Commission’s 
lackluster policy framework document likewise evinced a distinct lack of 
creativity in applying its mind to the coordination task.
140
 
 Moving forward, the Commission should devote less of its immediate 
attention to promulgating technical regulations and a great deal more to 
pondering what kinds of new investment regulations and investment treaty 
provisions actually stand a good chance of finding favor with both the 
Council and the Parliament.  There is no way of getting around this central 
challenge.  If any progress is to be made, it falls to the Commission to 
close the distance between the two institutions’ competing policy visions.  
This can only be done if the Commission proves willing to go out on a 
limb and propose innovative ways of responding to the Parliament’s major 
regulatory concerns while also satisfying the Council’s aggressive investor 
protection objectives. 
 Before moving on to the final section, it is worth pausing to consider 
why the Commission has not yet proven more proactive on the innovation 
front.  One might have expected a greater show of problem-solving 
initiative, given the Commission’s vast treaty negotiating expertise and its 
unenviable institutional positioning between the Council’s Scylla and the 
Parliament’s Charybdis.  One explanation may lie in the Commission’s 
desire to avoid what has lately become known as “NAFTA contagion.”  
This refers to the U.S. and Canadian-led phenomenon of concluding ever 
more detailed investment treaties which – while considerably longer and 
more difficult to negotiate than their predecessors – do little to clarify the 
actual content of states’ obligations toward foreign investors.141   
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 See discussion supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
137
 EU Regulation establishing transitional arrangements, supra note 13. 
138
 Discussed infra, note 68 and accompanying text. 
139
 As art 17(1) of the Consolidated TEU, supra note 2 puts it, one of the Commission’s 
principal functions is to “exercise coordinating, executive, and management functions.” 
140
 See discussion supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
141
 For allusions to this phenomenon, see e.g. Jan Kleinheisterkamp – Comments on 
Managing Financial Responsibility, supra note 87, para 38 (criticizing the Commission 
for distancing itself from the NAFTA practice of tying the FET standard to customary 
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 To the extent that the much criticized North American solutions are 
indeed inspiring the Commission’s reticence, one can but sympathize.142  
What is less apparent, however, is why the Commission should regard 
itself as limited by the previous innovations of others.  The U.S. and 
Canada may be somewhat trapped on their present trajectories by 
mechanisms like path dependency, vested interests, the impact of MFN 
clauses included in past treaties, and other constraints.  But the 
Commission has a one-time opportunity to sweep aside the past and chart 
an entirely new path for European international investment law and policy.  
It would be a shame to see it waste the rare gift of a blank slate by 
needlessly limiting itself to coloring within some imaginary North 
American lines.  Hopefully, the Commission’s Members will instead 
recognize that a renewed round of policy innovation is both possible and 
called for, and that the Commission is in the prime position to drive it.
143
 
D. Safeguarding of EU law by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
Last but not least, it is necessary to consider what role the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
144
 might play in the evolving EU 
international investment policy story.  Professor Reinisch has suggested 
that the CJEU will have the final word on some of the most controversial 
questions surrounding the scope and functioning of the new policy.
145
  In 
particular, he predicts that the Court will at some point be called upon to 
decide: 
 
 whether the EU is competent to conclude investment treaties with 
third states covering both foreign direct investment and portfolio 
investment (or whether such treaties must instead be concluded as 
                                                                                                                         
international law but without providing a workable alternative way to clarify the content 
of the standard); and “Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the 
‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — 
Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy,’” COM(2010) 343 
(2011/C 318/25), Rapporteur: Mr Jonathan PEEL, C318/150 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (29 Oct. 2011), para 4.4.1 (stressing that the EU “should build on its 
own strengths rather than imitate NAFTA”). 
142
 For a catalogue of some of the criticisms of the U.S. Model BIT program and an 
analysis of differences between the 2004 and 2012 Models, see Mark Kantor, The New 
U.S. Model BIT: If Both Sides Are Angry With You, You Must Be Doing Something 
Right, 5(2) NEW YORK DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAWYER (Fall 2012), reprinted in 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., ISSN: 1875-4120 (November 2012).  For criticisms from the 
opposing viewpoint see, Stephen Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty: an Exercise in the Regressive Development of International Law, 3(2) 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (April 2006). 
143
 This is not to suggest that the Commission must entirely reinvent the wheel when it 
comes to determining the wording of its future international investment agreements; only 
that it need not limit itself to adopting the refinements recently pioneered by the United 
States and Canada, which may or may not be suitable to the EU’s purposes. 
144
 Previously known as the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
145
 Reinisch – Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, at p. 39. 
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“mixed agreements” by the EU and its Member States acting 
jointly);  
 what will happen to the existing intra-EU BITs; and  
 whether the CJEU will accept a system of treaty-based investor-
state dispute settlement that grants party-appointed arbitrators a 
role in interpreting and applying certain aspects of EU law.
146
 
  
I do not disagree with Professor Reinisch’s identification of these three 
issues as the most likely to capture the Court’s attention.  But passing 
them through the prism of comparative institutional strengths can again 
shed a bit of differently colored light upon each issue. 
As is well known, the CJEU is the judicial body tasked with 
“ensur[ing] that in the interpretation and application of the [EU] Treaties 
the law is observed.”147  Its judges and advocates-general are “appointed 
by common accord of the governments of the Member States” for a 
renewable term of six years.
148
  They must be “persons whose 
independence is beyond doubt and who possess the ability required for 
appointment to high judicial office.”149  The Court’s jurisdiction extends 
to a wide array of matters, from policing the separation of powers 
boundaries between the Member States and the Union
150
 to hearing 
complaints by private persons against actions taken by EU institutions.
151
 
  When it comes to the EU’s future comprehensive international 
investment policy, a number of possible Court challenge scenarios might 
arise.  Beginning with the first of the three above-identified issues – the 
question of exclusive EU competency versus “mixed” EU-Member State 
competency to conclude new investment treaties with third states – the 
Court indeed has jurisdiction to decide the issue.
152
  The EU treaties 
                                                 
146
 Id. 
147
 Consolidated TEU, supra note 5, art. 19(1) (which sets out the general structure and 
jurisdiction of the Court). 
148
 Consolidated TFEU, supra note 5, art. 254. 
149
 Id.  See also id, at arts 251-257 (describing the composition of the General Court and 
of the Court of Justice, the appointment process for judges and advocates general, the 
eligibility requirements for both positions, and the respective jurisdictional competencies 
of the General Court and Court of Justice). 
150
 Consolidated TFEU, supra note 5, at art. 263 (allowing Member States, the 
Commission, the Parliament, and the Council to bring actions for annulment against any 
EU organ “on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their 
application, or misuse of powers”). 
151
 See id., at arts. 263 and 265 (allowing “any natural or legal person”, under certain 
conditions, to bring an action before the Court). 
152
 For purposes of the present analysis, I do not distinguish between actions over which 
the General Court has original jurisdiction and the Court of Justice only appellate 
jurisdiction, on the one hand, and actions over which the Court of Justice has original 
jurisdiction, on the other.  In any event, the treaties confer upon the Court of Justice the 
right to give the final word on all of the matters discussed here.  I therefore refer to the 
CJEU’s jurisdiction as shorthand for the cumulative (and in some cases sequential) 
jurisdiction of both courts. 
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permit it to do so upon application by one or more Member States and/or 
upon application by any of the principal EU institutions involved: 
Parliament, Council, and Commission.
153
    
 If the matter does end up before the CJEU, the Court’s past decisions 
suggest that it may prove more sympathetic to the Commission’s exclusive 
competence claim than to the mixed competence position asserted by 
some Member States.
154
  The Court’s observers have long noted its 
tendency to side with Community institutions in their attempts to exercise 
the broadest plausible interpretation of their enumerated Treaty powers 
over the Member States.  Moreover, the CJEU has demonstrated its 
eagerness to step in and clarify competence issues at the earliest available 
opportunity.
155
  Under its existing jurisprudence, the Court could resolve 
the investment treaty-making competence question in advance of any 
actual attempt by the Union to formally adopt an EU-wide investment 
treaty with a third state.
156
  It could even do so in advance of any attempt 
by the Commission to so much as open negotiations toward a given 
treaty.
157
 
 From a pragmatic standpoint, however, it is not obvious that this 
particular competence question is best resolved by the Court.  One of the 
most enduring criticisms that the Court has faced is that it has improperly 
ascribed to itself the role of “an engine for the building of the autonomous 
Community legal order”. 158   Without any democratic mandate, critics 
                                                 
153
 An ex ante challenge could be brought under 218(6)(b)(11) and an ex post challenge 
under art. 263 of the Consolidated TFEU, supra note 5. 
154
 I note that the Council has so far hedged on this point, which probably indicates that 
not all of the Member States are in agreement.  See e.g. Council – Conclusions on a 
Comprehensive EU Investment Policy, supra note 8, para 7 (stating that the Council 
“SUPPORTs the definition of a broad scope for the new EU policy in this field as 
suggested by the Commission, to be further elaborated in full respect of the respective 
competences of the Union and its Member States as defined by the Treaties”). 
155
 See, e.g. [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 715 (where the Court asserted its duty to “forestall 
[rather than rectify after-the-fact] complications which would result from legal disputes 
concerning the compatibility with the Treaty of international agreements binding upon 
the Community”).   
156
 See Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, at art. 218(6)(b)(11) (“A Member State, the 
European Parliament, the Council or the Commission may obtain the opinion of the Court 
of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties. Where 
the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into force 
unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised”). 
157
 See Re the Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights Convention 
(Opinion 2/94), [1996] E.C.R. I-1784, para 6, [1996] C.M.L.R. 265, 287 (“where a 
question of competence has to be decided, it is in the interests of the Community 
Institutions and of the States concerned, including non-member countries, to have that 
question clarified from the outset of negotiation and even before the main points of the 
agreement are negotiated”). 
158
 Judge Fernand Schockweiler, La Cour de justice des Communautés européennes 
dépasse-t-elle les limites de ses attributions?, 18 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX, DROIT 
EUROPÉEN 73 (1995).  Most scholars agree that the Court chiefly pursues this goal by 
employing a teleological method of interpretation.  See, e.g. Nial Fennelly, Legal 
Where Should Europe’s Investment Path 
Lead? 
33 
 
charge, it has pushed the development of the European Union in directions 
never fathomed or assented to by the Member States and their citizens.  
This criticism featured heavily in debates over the EU’s democratic deficit 
in the decade leading up to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.
159
  It was 
partly in response to this that the Lisbon Treaty enhanced the legislative 
powers of the Parliament and placed greater cooperation burdens upon the 
Parliament and the Council acting in tandem.
160
   
 Arguably, then, by making international investment policy subject to 
the legislative co-decision procedure, the Member States have signaled 
their preference for working out their substantive disagreements through a 
process of inter-institutional dialogue in which both the EU institutions 
and the Member States (acting through the Council) have an equal say.  In 
any event, it is unclear what might be gained by referring a dispute over 
exclusive versus mixed competence in investment treaty matters to the 
CJEU.  Even if the Court were to come down on the side of the EU’s 
exclusive competence, the Council’s special unanimity requirement would 
nevertheless force the Commission to negotiate investment treaties which 
each and every Member State would be individually willing to ratify.  As a 
practical matter, the best way to do this is to facilitate the active 
involvement of the Member States’ respective investment treaty 
negotiators in at least the first few sets of EU-level negotiations.  This 
suggests that the competence question may be more academic than real. 
 The question as to what will become of existing intra-EU BITs raises 
some similar considerations.  If the matter is dealt with through inter-
institutional dialogue, the co-decision procedure (in combination with the 
special unanimity requirement) will again ensure that the eventual solution 
meets with the satisfaction of all parties concerned.
161
  There would be no 
need for any involvement by the Court.  But what if ensuing events instead 
lead to a showdown between the Commission – which regards intra-EU 
BITs as unlawful under the Treaties – and the Member States that refuse 
to terminate their intra-EU BITs?
162
   It is under this scenario that the 
CJEU has a pivotal role to play. 
                                                                                                                         
Interpretation at the European Court of Justice, 20(3) FORDHAM J. INT’L L. 656-79 (1997) 
and references cited therein. 
159
 See references cited supra, note 81. 
160
 See supra note 80. 
161
 Indeed, this is precisely what happened in the case of the recently adopted regulation 
governing transitional arrangements for Member States’ extra-EU BITs (EU Regulation 
establishing transitional arrangements, supra note 13). 
162
 In a May 2013 appearance before Parliament, European Commissioner Karel de Gucht 
(DG Trade) stated: 
 
The Commission agrees that bilateral and investment treaties (BITS) 
between EU Member States do not comply with EU law.  […]  All the 
Member States except one have such intra-EU BITS in force.  
Commission officials have therefore initiated informal discussions with 
them with a view to reaching agreement on the joint termination of all 
these agreements within an agreed time frame. 
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 When it comes to intra-EU BITs, there can be little doubt that they 
violate the fundamental principles of the Common Market.  By granting 
either greater substantive legal protections
163
 or greater access to legal 
remedies
164
 to investors from some EU states than to investors from others, 
intra-EU BITs contravene the EU’s prohibition against discrimination 
among EU citizens on the basis of nationality.
165
   
 The fact that intra-EU BITs exist at all appears to be an artifact of 
historical oversight.  Their existence was never mentioned in the 
successive rounds of accession treaties concluded between the Community 
and the newly acceding Member States.  They continue in force today 
only because the accession treaties neglected to explicitly terminate 
them.
166
  And so far, investment arbitration tribunals have found the terms 
of the accession treaties insufficiently definite to conclude that they 
impliedly terminated the intra-EU BITs as a matter of international law.
167
  
                                                                                                                         
 
Several Member States have already agreed bilaterally to terminate 
their agreements, and the Commission has encouraged them to proceed 
with doing so.  However, in those cases where Member States are not 
willing to terminate agreements, the Commission is ready to play its 
role as a guardian of the Treaties so as to ensure compliance with EU 
law. 
 
Comments of European Commissioner Karel de Gucht, (DG Trade) (22 May 
2013), European Parliament, Plenary Session from 20.05.2013 to 23.05.2013, 
Debate on “Financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement 
tribunals established by international agreements to which the EU is a party,”, 
transcript available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20130522+ITEM-019+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN. 
163
 Where a BIT’s investment protection standards are higher than those afforded by 
national and EU law. 
164
 Since investors, under a BIT, can enforce their rights either through the national courts 
or through international arbitration – the latter being in many cases a more effective 
means of obtaining compensation than the former. 
165
 This is prohibited under Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2, art. 18.  In a 2012 decision, 
the Frankfurt Court of Appeals (reviewing an arbitration award issued under an intra-EU 
BIT) found that intra-EU BITs may well violate article 18 of the TFEU, since they allow 
some EU investors by not others to initiate arbitration proceedings against certain 
Member States.  The Court nevertheless upheld the arbitration award.  It opined that the 
proper remedy to the nationality based discrimination problem would be to require the 
Member States to offer the option of investor-state arbitration to all EU investors, even in 
the absence of an applicable BIT.  (See Eureko v. Slovakia, case no. 26 SchH 11/10, 
Frankfurt Court of Appeals, available (in German) at:  www.italaw.com).  The court’s 
decision is curious, since it is not clear whence the suggested authority to force Member 
States to grant this expanded consent to investor-state arbitration derives.  There is no 
provision of the EU treaties which purports to grant either the EU or the Member States’ 
courts the power to order Member States to consent to investor-state arbitration with all 
EU investors. 
166
 It is to be hoped that the EU will rectify this error in future accession treaties. 
167
 The relevant legal provisions governing the implicit termination of international 
treaties are articles 30(2) and 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331.  Examples of cases in which arbitral tribunals have assumed jurisdiction 
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The reason why the matter has not yet reached the CJEU is probably 
because the Commission does not wish to antagonize the powerful 
Member States that have balked at the idea of voluntarily terminating their 
intra-EU BITs at a time when the Commission needs their support in order 
to forge a new comprehensive EU external investment policy.
168
   
 Still, intra-EU BITs cannot forever remain in legal limbo.  Either the 
Commission
169
 or an unhappy Member State
170
 will eventually find an 
opportune moment to challenge them, and when this happens, the Court 
will almost certainly force the recalcitrant Member States’ hands.  The 
only question is whether it will be worth the judicial showdown to reach 
this inevitable result.  From the perspective of “old Europe” investors who 
are invested in “new Europe” countries, the answer may be yes.  The 
delayed legal fight is worth it to them if it buys a few more years of 
privileged legal protection in the meantime.  This is especially true when it 
comes to investments in Member States whose domestic court systems are 
considered sub-par by contemporary standards.
171
  But from the 
perspectives of the rule of law, free and fair competition, and the broader 
ideals of the European project, the answer must be no.  A drag-the-feet 
strategy only perpetuates nationality-based discrimination among EU 
investors.  In so doing, it also places the Member States that maintain 
intra-EU BITs in perpetual violation of their duty of cooperation under the 
EU Treaties.
172
   
 The CJEU can put to an end to this anomalous situation with the stroke 
of its pen.  As the authoritative interpreter of the EU Treaties, the Court 
possesses the exclusive ability to issue final and binding pronouncements 
on questions of EU law and to order all who are subject to its jurisdiction 
to comply with that law.
173
  It can, in other words, order the Member 
States to either terminate their existing intra-EU BITs or amend them so as 
to remove their discriminatory provisions and impacts.   
                                                                                                                         
over investor-state disputes under intra-EU BITs include:  Eastern Sugar v. Czech 
Republic, Partial Award, 27 March 2007; Eureko v. Slovakia, Award on Jurisdiction, 26 
October 2010; Eureko v. Poland, Partial Award, 19 August 2005; and Ioan Micula and 
others v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction of 24 
September 2008. 
168
 It is nevertheless surprising that none of the EU-Member States that have faced 
multiple claims under intra-EU BITs has sought to bring the matter before the Court.  
This could in principle be done via an infringement action lodged by one Member State 
against another under art. 259 of the Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2. 
169
 Under art. 258 of the Consolidated TFEU, id. 
170
 Perhaps one, like Ireland, whose investors do not enjoy the benefits of any intra-EU 
BITs. 
171
 Particularly as they will enjoy all the benefits of the extended privilege without 
incurring any of the costs of the eventual legal battle. 
172
 It may also open some of the “old Europe” countries up to unwanted surprises in the 
form of investor-state disputes in the interim – a very real prospect which few of them 
appear to be taking seriously. 
173
 Consolidated TEU, supra note 2, art. 19(1). 
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 A comparative institutional analysis suggests that the Court should do 
precisely this if and when the intra-EU BITs problem comes before it.  
Two principal considerations support this conclusion.  First, there is no 
other body that can end these ongoing violations of EU law after political 
persuasion and compromise have failed.  The violations could continue 
indefinitely if the Court were to stay its hand – hardly an appealing 
outcome.  Second, unlike in the case of the exclusive versus mixed 
competence question, there is no democratic deficit problem to be 
concerned with here.  Recall that the task of identifying what role the 
Court should play in deciding the investment treaty-making competence 
question is not really a matter of ascertaining the Court’s jurisdiction; the 
potential value-add of a CJEU decision on that point is undermined by the 
fact that the EU Treaties give the Member States the right to veto the 
adoption of new EU-wide investment laws and policies in any event.
174
  
By contrast, in resolving the intra-EU BITs quandary, the Court would 
merely be exercising its power to order the Member States to comply with 
EU Treaty obligations to which they have already consented.  Thus, no 
comparable political consent problem arises. 
 Third and finally, what role should the CJEU play in determining 
whether the EU’s future investment treaties may properly include a system 
of investor-state dispute settlement that grants party-appointed arbitrators 
a role in interpreting and applying some aspects of EU law?  Here I will 
limit myself to two blunt observations.  The CJEU, much like domestic 
constitutional and supreme courts the world over, is a zealous guardian of 
its own jurisdiction.
175
  And although countless scholars and judges have 
criticized the Court for overreaching on numerous occasions,
176
 the 
Member States have yet to adopt any EU treaty amendment which scales 
back its powers.   
 It therefore seems safe to conclude, as the European Parliament has 
done,
177
 that the EU’s future international investment treaties must find a 
way to ensure that EU law – as articulated by the CJEU – is fully 
respected and applied within the context of future investor-state arbitration 
proceedings involving EU parties.   Failing this, investment arbitration 
risks meeting with the same fate as every other legal arrangement that has 
ever attempted to free itself of the Court’s control over the development of 
EU law
178
 and/or eschew the application of what the Court regards as 
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 See the discussion infra, pp. 31-32. 
175
 See the excellent discussion in Reinisch – Quo Vadis Europe?, supra note 2, pp. 34-38 
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 For a chronology of the major accusations of judicial activism by the Court, see Henri 
de Waele, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Integration Process: A 
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 See Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution – Managing Financial 
Responsibility for ISDS, supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. 
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 The Court has been aggressive on this front through its preliminary rulings 
jurisprudence under art. 267 of the Consolidated TFEU, supra note 2. 
Where Should Europe’s Investment Path 
Lead? 
37 
 
mandatory EU law.
179
  To whit – it can expect to receive a big, fat legally-
binding pronouncement of “not a chance”.   
There is also a yet starker possibility that could arise in respect of 
investment treaty disputes brought against the Union (as opposed to 
against an individual Member State).  The CJEU might be tempted to 
declare itself the appropriate body to hear such claims under article 268 of 
the TFEU, which gives the Court jurisdiction “in disputes relating to 
compensation for damage” involving the non-contractual liability of the 
Union.
180
  Such an outcome would throw into disarray the current plans 
for developing a shared responsibility regulation governing the respective 
legal and financial liabilities of the Union and the Member States in 
connection with investor-state arbitration proceedings.  More than that, it 
could altogether preclude the EU and the Member States from consenting 
to resolve future treaty-based investment disputes before any other forum 
but the CJEU. 
 For these reasons, if the EU’s political organs wish to include investor-
state arbitration provisions in at least some of the EU’s future investment 
treaties, the wisest course would be for the Commission, Council, and 
Parliament to take great pains to word those treaties in such a way as to 
ensure that no question of a conflict between the EU’s external investment 
treaties and its internal law ever comes before the Court.  This will no 
doubt require developing some creative new textual provisions.  Simply 
adopting the innovations introduced by other countries in their recent 
model BITs will not suffice to address the unique problems that arise in 
the EU context.  But difficult though the drafting challenge may be, the 
eventual costs of neglecting it probably outweigh the up-front costs of 
undertaking it.  The CJEU’s comparative institutional advantage is its 
ability to have the final word on all matters of EU law.  It should be 
expected – in both the prescriptive and normative senses of the word – to 
play to its strengths. 
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 The paradigmatic case known to arbitration practitioners is Eco Swiss China Time Ltd 
v. Benetton Int’l NV, [1999] E.C.R. I-30555 (E.C.J.) (finding an arbitration award 
defective due to the arbitral tribunal’s failure to consider and apply EC competition law, 
even though neither party had raised that point before the original tribunal). 
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 Such a possibility would obviously depend upon whether the CJEU would regard 
investment treaty obligations as a form of contractual liability or as a form of non-
contractual liability.  In the former case, the treaty’s dispute resolution provisions would 
presumptively apply.  Any incompatibility between those provisions and EU law would, 
as discussed above, most likely result in the invalidation of the non-conforming 
provisions of the investment treaty.  It is only in the latter case (treaty liability not 
regarded as a form of contractual liability) that article 268 of the Consolidated TFEU, 
supra note 2, arguably provides the Court with jurisdiction to decide the claim itself.  
Note that art. 268 refers to art. 340, which states:  “[i]n the case of non-contractual 
liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws 
of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants 
in the performance of their duties.”  An EU-wide investment treaty could potentially be 
viewed as a statement of the relevant “general principles common to the laws of the 
Member States” which the Court should apply. 
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CONCLUSION 
The passage of the Lisbon Treaty announced the dawn of a new era for 
the European Union.  It is to be an era in which democratic participation is 
deepened, the autonomous rights of the Member States are safeguarded 
with renewed diligence, and uniform respect for the rule of European law 
is demanded equally of Member States, old and new.  Each of these 
objectives is embedded in the institutional arrangements by which the EU 
must now forge its comprehensive Union-wide international investment 
policy.  The question as to where European investment policy will go in 
the future must therefore be answered with full awareness of and due 
respect for the comparative institutional strengths and weaknesses of the 
EU’s Parliament, Council, Commission, and Court. 
The Parliament is best suited to conduct a thorough democratic vetting 
of proposed EU investment policies, regulations, and treaties.  Its 
democratic mandate equips it to insist that all new EU investment laws 
adequately address the concerns raised by EU citizens before attaining the 
requisite parliamentary assent.  When it comes to safeguarding the 
interests of particular Member States, on the other hand, the Council takes 
the pole position.  It is for the Council to ensure that the collective wisdom 
of the Member States’ past experiences with bilateral investment treaties 
and investor-state arbitration claims is reflected in the negotiating 
mandates it provides to the Commission and in the investment-related 
regulations and treaties it adopts in co-decision with the Parliament.   
For its part, the Commission serves two demanding masters.  
Fortunately, its first mover advantage gives it the flexibility to suggest 
innovative approaches to closing the gap between the investment policy 
objectives of the Parliament and those of the Council. Thanks to its 
extensive experience negotiating trade agreements on behalf of the Union , 
the Commission is well placed to propose feasible means of 
accomplishing this difficult Parliament/Council coordination task.  
Finally, the Court of Justice of the European Union plays the always-
important role of judicial backstop.   With its power to resolve competence 
disputes between the Member States and the EU organs, to decide the 
ultimate fate of intra-EU BITs, and to order the alteration of any new 
external EU investment treaties that do not comply with internal EU law, 
the Court’s potential involvement looms large in the background.  Let us 
hope that this will motivate the relevant actors to work out reasonable 
solutions on their own.  But if not, it is comforting to know that the Court 
can be called upon to resolve contested legal issues as necessary. 
Assuming each of the four major EU institutions embraces its new 
investment-related powers in a manner that displays due regard for the 
comparative institutional advantages of its counterparts, Europe’s 
comprehensive international investment policy will emerge through a 
process of productive inter-institutional dialogue.  The signs so far are 
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encouraging.
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  While the Council, Parliament, and Commission started 
off advancing disparate and seemingly irreconcilable policy objectives, 
their recent communications have demonstrated a much greater 
willingness to compromise.  This trend is likely to gain further momentum, 
in my estimation.  The structural checks and balances which the Lisbon 
Treaty imposes upon each institution’s competencies in the investment 
arena effectively prohibit any one institution from moving forward 
without getting the others on board.   
But as this healthy inter-institutional cooperation gathers steam, 
European decision-makers should take care not to let momentum 
overwhelm introspection.  The Lisbon Treaty has given them a one-time 
opportunity to infuse an old international legal regime with a new set of 
democratic ideals.  Only by seizing the chance to reflect critically upon 
what its Member States’ individual investment policies have achieved 
separately in the past can Europe think creatively about what its common 
investment policy should achieve collectively in the future.  If it does so, 
the Lisbon Treaty may one day be regarded as the dawn not only of a 
more democratic European Union, but of a more democratic international 
investment law system. 
                                                 
181
 As this article went to print, press reports indicated that the Council had approved a 
negotiating mandate for the Commission’s TTIP talks with the U.S. which takes a much 
more cautious approach to investor-state dispute settlement than the Council had taken in 
its prior communications.  According to one such report: 
a US demand to talk about the terms of protection for each other's 
investments – was settled early on, with a decision to allow talks.  
However, a majority of states, a diplomat from an EU member state 
said, are extremely wary at the prospect of the advent of US-style 
corporate litigation [aka aggressive investor-state arbitration claims].  
The EU would, he said, need a big trade-off before they would be 
willing to harmonise investment-protection law. 
European Voice, “Traumatic birth for EU-US trade talks,” by Andrew Gardner (14 June 
2013), available at: http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/june/traumatic-birth-for-
eu-us-trade-talks/77548.aspx.  
